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Abstract
The association between leftism and ecologism is analyzed comparatively in a sample of 27 countries,
based on data stemming from the fifth wave of World Values Survey (conducted 2005-2007). As a first
major result, it is found that the Western countries (encompassing Western European, USA, Canada and
Australia) stand out as a distinct group with a highly homogeneous political culture: in the sense that in
all of them, ecologism shows a tight “vertical coupling” to the general ideological left-right scale on the
one hand and considerable “horizontal couplings” to other leftist issue dimensions on the other. India
and South Korea are the only nonwestern countries where a similar (however very moderate) correlation
between leftism and ecologism can be found. Secondly, leftist ideologies are most pronounced within
highly educated strata in Western countries. Very few other countries (Slovenia, India and Mexico)
show a similar pattern. Thirdly, a comparative analysis of age cohorts provides very little evidence for
major intergenerational change. In particular, there is no evidence that any interregional or even global
diffusion of political ideology has taken place that would cause more transnational homogeneity among
younger populations. To summar-ize, we may conclude that “leftist ecologism” is a specific feature of
Western countries that unites Western Europe with North America and Oceania, but divides them from
South America and Asia as well as from their neighboring countries to the East. 
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1. Research perspectives and hypotheses 
During the last decades, many empirical studies have shown that in a wide range of different countries, 
individual political attitudes as well as political party systems, policies and regimes are predominantly 
organized along a single dimension of left and right. (Castles & Mair 1984; Gross & Sigelman 1984; Janda 
1980; Laver & Budge 1993; Warwick 1992; Colomer & Escatel 2003: 3; Geser 2008). Thus, most citizens in 
most countries have been shown willing and able to place themselves on the left-right dimension: a scale 
usually ranging from 1-10 or from 0-10. (Inglehart & Klingemann 1987; Colomer & Escatel 2003: 3). Like 
the vertical top-bottom model of social stratification, the LR-scheme is a simple spatial metaphor that 
has the characteristic of being adopted in very different human cultures: being used as the “political es-
peranto of our times” (Laponce 1981: 27). 
 
Apart from this basic regularity, however, many more detailed issues need further clarification by wide-
spread and continuing efforts of empirical research; issues concerning 
1) the evolving semantics of "left" and "right" through time and space, and the changing associations 
between LR-placements and political issue positions; 
2) the degree to which the LR-scheme is established (and “vertically coupled” with specific political issue 
positions) within different nations and geographic regions; 
3) the unequal distribution of LR-thinking among different population segments within nations. 
 
1.1 From socialism to feminism, pacifism and ecologism: the changing semantic 
of leftist ideology  
It is astonishing to what degree the permanence of the left-right dimensions contrasts sharply with ex-
treme variations of the meanings associated with these two terms across historic periods and between 
different cultures. 
At the beginning 19th century, leftism was mainly associated with individualism, free enterprise, national 
independence and - following Rousseau - an endeavour to restore a more perfect form of human society 
as it had presumably existed in the past (Laponce 1981: 118ff.). Between about 1850 and 1960, it was 
almost exclusively amalgamated to socialist and communist ideologies associated with revolutionary 
movements, labour unions and reformist social democratic parties: thus giving priority to issues of eco-
nomic governance, work organization, class relations and social welfare. During the Cold War, most - de-
veloped and underdeveloped - countries were highly affected by exogenous determinants of LR divi-
sions. Leftism was essentially connected with political forces supporting the communism and the USSR, 
while “rightism” was a label given to explicitly “anticommunist” movements, personalities and political 
parties. Thus, the studies based on Eurobarometer 30 (1988) could show that in many European coun-
tries, rightism was strongly correlated with proudness of nationality as well as with nearness to fascist 
movements (Falter/Schumann 1992: 200). 
Subsequently, the collapse of the Warsaw Pact countries has caused the solidified international system 
of leftist ideology to erode: replacing it with that a manifold of leftisms deeply shaped by national and 
regional cultures. In the late Sixties, the civil rights movements and the student revolts gave rise to a 
new, more encompassing understanding of leftism (or: "radicalism"): including the perspective of ex-
tending basic standards of human rights and welfare to all kinds of discriminated population segments 
(like non-whites, females, gays, starving poor in underdeveloped nations etc.). In a broader sense, there 
emerged potent movements of "social liberalism" directed against traditional values and habits that 
sought to prevent full individual self-determination (e.g. the feminist, gay and "pro-choice"-movements). 
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In addition, issues related to transnational solidarity, peace and justice have gained ground: manifested 
in various movements favoring military disarmament, development aid and free transnational migration. 
Within the same time period, ecologist issues gained increased prominence on political agendas and 
were incorporated in programs aiming to catalyze societal and economic change. 
 
The relationship of ecologism (as well as social liberalism, feminism and pacifism) to the Left-Right axis 
has remained a controversial issue ever since. On the one hand, ecologism has often been declared to 
constitute a new ideological dimension less and less associated with conventional leftist radicalism. Thus, 
an early cross-national study (comparing the populations of England, Germany and the United States) 
has found that ecologist attitudes were not correlated .with standings on traditional left-right issues (like 
governmental control) (Kessel &Tischler 1984). In a similar vein, Ronald Inglehart presented convincing 
empirical data which showed that the attitudes of the general electorates of seven European countries 
toward "materialist" issues and toward "postmaterialist" issues are rather weakly correlated with each 
other. As correlations have been particularly low among younger age cohorts, it is concluded that inter-
generational change may contribute to a growing independence of these two dimensions (Inglehart 
1984, 25ff; Inglehart 1989: 372ff.). This converged with Clark and Lipset who supposed that rising afflu-
ence and intergenerational change would lead to a growing salience of "social value issues" which consti-
tute "a distinct political dimension from more traditional economic or fiscal issues." (Clark/Lipset/Rempel 
1993: 305). 
 
On the other hand, there is also evidence that attitudes toward "old" and "new" political issues are sig-
nificantly interrelated, and that this linkage has not been eroded by either socioeconomic development 
or intergenerational change. 
1) Ecologism and social liberalism start from the basic premise that processes of socioeconomic devel-
opment have resulted in a neglect of other important values and/or in enormous negative consequences 
that call for compensative and/or corrective actions (on the level of governmental legislation action as 
well as on the level of everyday life). 
2) Both ideologies gave rise to "new social movements" very similar in terms of membership composi-
tion, rhetoric, tactical behavior and internal organization. Among other similarities, all these movements 
relied much on informal network structures, recruited their membership mainly from younger and more 
educated strata, particularly from social and cultural occupations (Kriesi 1989). 
3) It cannot be denied that during the last 20 years, many Western countries (particularly in Europe) 
have seen the emergence of "red-green parties" which combine ecological and social liberalist standings 
with pronounced leftist positions in all traditional domains (e.g. in economic and social policy ) (Poguntke 
1987). 
 
In a sophisticated empirical study, Weakliem (1991) has shown that the "materialist" and the "postmate-
rialist" dimension of political ideology show considerable values of interfactor correlations (between .40 
and .60). This is quite consistent with Inglehart's findings that, at least for political elites, materialistic 
and postmaterialistic issue positions appear to remain more closely linked and to be components of an 
overarching left-right dimension encompassing economic as well as non-economic issues. (Inglehart 
1984: 33). 
All this conforms to Sani and Sartoris view that Left and Right are just "empty containers" that can be 
filled with various meanings by anybody (Sani & Sartori 1983). 
In her extensive study based on Eurobarometer data from 1999, Corrie Potter concludes that 
"..The semantic container hypothesis is strongly supported. Postmaterialism values are significant predic-
tors of left self-placement, while material values are strong predictors of right self-placement. Thus, the 
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post-materialism/materialism cleavage seems to have been incorporated into the left right dimension in 
the understandings of Western Europeans. (Potter 2001: 7). 
Evidently, the LR-dimension has an astounding capacity to absorb new political values, issues and strate-
gic goals (e. g. of social movements) However, these new aspects seem to complement and overlay the 
old ones without replacing them (Mair 1997:26; Inglehart 1984; Knutsen 1995). 
In a recent comparative study on Swiss local parties, the author has demonstrated that the political atti-
tudes of these groupings are characterized by a singe left-right dimension which combines classical so-
cialist with more contemporary ecologist positions. Diachronic comparisons show that the “vertical cou-
pling” of these issue-related attitudes (to the general left-right scale) as well as their “horizontal cou-
pling” (= the correlations among themselves) have increased in the period between 1989 and 2002 (Ge-
ser 2009). 
 
Most recently, however, some trends toward a growing dissociation between leftism and ecologism can 
be observed. Switzerland, for instance, currently (summer 2011) sees the rise of a “Green Liberal” party 
(founded in July 2007) which combines strict support for ecological policies with conservative positions 
in social welfare and fiscal issues. On the other hand, the nuclear catastrophe in Fukushima has pro-
moted the spread of antinuclear standings to parties of the middle and even to the right: particularly in 
Germany where the conservative-liberal cabinet lead by Angela Merkel has formally decided upon the 
definitive early shut down of all nuclear plants (in May 2011). 
 
1.2. International and intercontinental variations 
The political left-right dimension has originated in France at the time before the revolution, some weeks 
after the convention of the Estates General in June 1789 (Laponce 1981:47). During the 19th century, the 
LR pattern spread to the rest of continental Europe, especially driven by socialist parties who loaded the 
terms with ideological content (Laponce 1981: 54). Outside Europe, however, the left-right dimension is 
less established even in democratic countries. In the United States and Japan for instance, the reigning 
polarity is still "liberal vs. conservative"; but it has been increasingly overlaid and reshaped by left-right 
considerations (Laponce 1981: 56). As Nie & Anderson have demonstrated in a longitudinal study, the 
general American public became “ideologized” in the years between 1964 and 1972: since the rise of the 
"New left Movements" and especially since the 1972 elections, where Nixon and McGovern represented 
for the first time quite neatly the two ideological poles (Nie & Anderson 1972; LeBlanc & Merrin 1977; 
Inglehart 1989: 367).  
 
Many studies have shown that the salience of LR-thinking extends widely beyond the sphere of Western 
democracies, but that it is of significantly lower importance in less developed and less democratic na-
tions. 
In Latin America, data from Latinobarometer annual surveys from 1995 to 2002 show that highest per-
centages of self raters were found in Uruguay (92%) and Brazil (85%), while lowest proportions were ob-
served in Guatemala, Costa Rica, Colombia, Bolivia and Argentina (between 71 and 76 percent) (Colomer 
& Escatel 2003: 4). However, such individual views are rather loosely coupled to political parties. On the 
one hand, there are many self-placers who are very alienated from the existing party system; on the 
other hand, we find highly politicized people who don’t identify with the LR-dimension, because they 
maintain an opportunistic (“clientelistic”) relationship to political parties (Colomer & Escatel 2003: 6). 
Contrasting with post-materialist trends in developed Western countries, Zechmeister has found that in 
Mexico, the meaning of “left” was increasingly shifting toward economic issues between 2001 and 2004 
(Zechmeister 2005: 18).  
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Even less consistent are the conditions are found in the post- communist countries of Eastern Europe 
and the former USSR. First of all, they have just recently been exposed to Western influences and may 
still be in the process of adopting basic democratic values and ideological orientations. Thus, Badescu & 
Sum (2005) have shown that in postsocialist countries, only 55% percent of respondents (in comparison 
to 73% in Western democracies) were ready to place themselves on the LR scale. Unsurprisingly, 
Badescu and Sum have found much higher self placement percentages in the more Western oriented 
countries like Czechia, Hungary and Poland then in Russia and Belarus (with less then 30%) (Badescu & 
Sum 2005). And secondly, the particular history of these countries has resulted in paradox semantic re-
versals of the two ideological poles. In a way, the most leftist (ex communist) parties are "conservative" 
or even "reactionary" insofar as they still cling to values or institutions stemming from the earlier societal 
system; and the liberals and conservatives are most "revolutionary" insofar as they aim at a radical trans-
formation according to western standards (Evans & Whitefield 1998; Norris 2004). By comparing data 
from 1996-01 and 2001-2005, Badescu and Sum conclude that in post-communist countries the percent-
age of respondents ready to locate parties on the LR scale has even decreased (Badescu & Sum 2005). 
 
As a general rule, the meaning of left-right polarities seems to be profoundly determined by the social 
and cultural cleavages predominant within a specific national society. In several East Asian countries, for 
instance, the weakness of class divisions implies that ideological conflicts focus mainly on questions of 
international relations and the domestic political order (Weisberg 2001, 90; Deegan-Krause 2006). 
In a recent study of the author covering all continents, it has been found that in all regions except the 
Middle East, at least 75 percent of the total population (and over eighty percent of politically interested 
respondents) are ready to place themselves on a respective LR-scale (Geser 2008). This conforms with 
the notion that on a global scale, Islamism represents the only salient alternative to Western political 
culture.. Most remarkably, East Asian countries have internalized left-right thinking to a higher degree 
than post-socialist European countries - despite their larger geographical and cultural distance from the 
Western world. Opinions on "materialist as well as "postmaterialist" issues are likewise associated with 
LR self placements in most countries. However, there are many discrepancies that reflect the varying 
political cultures and political problem agendas of different regions. As expected, items related to envi-
ronmental protection and "job protectionism" are more salient in higher developed countries (Geser 
2008). Other studies have supported the hypothesis that postmaterialist values are not related to leftism 
in underdeveloped countries. The results of Riviero African study, for instance, show that neither abor-
tion nor environmental issues are of any significance in countries like Uganda, Zimbabwe and Algeria – 
not even on the elite levels. (Riviero 2004). Only in the case of South Africa (the wealthiest of the com-
pared nations) a modest impact of environmental values on left-right self placement could be found. 
 
1.3 Inhomogeneities within national populations 
Many theoretical arguments and at least some empirical findings suggest that even within developed 
countries where the left-right dimension is fully institutionalized, politically sophisticated individuals are 
better able to make use of political labels like “left” and “right” because they are better informed about 
their meaning (Sniderman et.al. 1991; Kitschelt& Hellemans 1990; Klingemann 1979 etc.).  
In the early Sixties already, Converse has observed that highly educated and politically interested indi-
viduals were more inclined to think in abstract ideological terms (Converse 1964), and various studies 
have shown that issue positions and left-right self placements are more tightly correlated when the level 
of political cognition is high (e. g. Inglehart/Klingemann 1976). 
Nie and Andersen
 
have found consistency among elites’ responses on a wide range of issues concerning 
the scope of government activity enabling them to identify clear “liberals” and “conservatives.”  On the 
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level of uneducated strata, however, “there is little or no interdependence … in mass attitudes, because 
mass publics have neither the educational background, the contextual knowledge nor the capacity to deal 
with abstract concepts that sustain an organized set of beliefs over a wide range of political issues” (Nie 
& Anderson 1974). 
Eurobarometer studies have shown that within a sample of political candidates, the statistical variance 
of LR self-placements explained by issue positions was four times as high as within a sample of ordinary 
voters (Inglehart 1989: 368). Similarly, Lambert et. al. have found in a large Canadian sample that re-
spondents with low education were least able to connect left-right self placements with specific political 
attitudes and issue positions (Lambert et. al. 1986). 
In countries which have only recently been affected by left-right ideologies or in which the diffusion 
process is still going on, we may expect that the elites act as forerunning opinion leaders: so that larger 
elite-nonelite differentials in the usage of left-right patterns should be found than in countries where the 
LR dimension is established since very long. This hypothesis is supported by Rivero’s study on four Afri-
can countries where it was found that the predictive power of political and economic attitudes on LR 
self-placement was much higher among elites than among the general population (Rivero 2004).  
In a recent comparative study covering 62 countries (Geser 2008), the author has found that in all re-
gions, left-right self identifications are particularly widespread among the more educated and the more 
politically active strata: indicating that they are highly central, institutionalied features of the respective 
political systems. Even Muslim populations follow neatly this trend: illustrating the degree to which al-
ternative Islamist notions are more salient among lower endogenenous strata than among the elites. A 
second finding was that irrespective of region, LR self placements are moderately more prevalent among 
male and urban respondents and among populations of richer countries, while age and income levels are 
less consequential.  
In a second study including 2500 Swiss local parties, the author has found that groupings operating in 
urban context and endowed with a highly educated membership were more prone to organize their po-
litical issue positions tightly around a dominating left-right axis (Geser 2009).  
This conforms well to Inglehart’s findings that higher educated social strata and political elites are more 
prone to organize their political attitudes in a coherent fashion: by cultivating an overarching left-right 
dimension that encompasses classical socialist as well as new postmaterialist positions (Inglehart 1984: 
33). 
 
1.4 Research Questions 
On the basis of all these considerations, our investigation focuses on the question how ecologism is “ver-
tically” related to general left-right ideology on the one hand “horizontally” interrelated to other issue 
dimensions of leftism, and how such relationships differ between various nations and geographic regions 
as well as between various segments of intranational populations. In particular, comparisons between 
income and educational groups should reveal to what degree such relationships have currently diffused 
to various social strata, and divergences between age cohorts may indicate how relationships between 
leftism and ecologism have recently evolved. 
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2. Data and Methodology 
2.1 Selection of countries 
The following empirical findings are based on the fifth wave of the World Values Survey that has taken 
place between 2005 and 2007. In the file released in 2009, we find surveys on 57 countries encompass-
ing respondents between 16 and 103(!) years. Out of these, 27 nations have been selected because for 
them, full data on all the independent and dependent variables taken into consideration are available, 
namely: Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, Finland, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, 
Mexico, Moldova, Norway, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, South Korea, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Turkey, Ukraine, United States, Uruguay, Vietnam.  
2.2 Selection of politically interested respondents 
Given the basic undisputed argument that respondents with low political interest use to be insufficiently 
informed about political ideology and political issues, they have been eliminated from the sample. In 
more concrete terms, the sample has been restricted to those about 46% (=16269) of respondents who 
indicated that they were “very interested” or at least “somewhat interested” in political matters (e023; 
Table 1)  
 
Table 1: Frequency distribution: according to the dregree of general interest in political matters. 
 
 Interest in Politics 
 Very interested Somewhat interested Not very interested Not at all interested 
N =  4017 12252 11032 7834 
% 11.4 34.9 31.4 22.3 
 
2.3 The left-Right scale 
The ideological Left-Right orientation was assessed by the self-placement on a sacle ranging from 1 (ex-
treme left) to 10 (extreme right). 
“In political matters, people talk of "the left" and "the right." How would you place your views on this scale, general-
ly speaking?” (e033). 
 
Table 2: Values on the left-right scale: Frequency distribution of the total sample of 27 nations. (only politically 
interested respondents). 
 
 Value on the Left-Right-Scale 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
N 869 570 1376 1339 3420 1734 1553 1537 724 1576 
% 5.9 3.9 9.4 9.1 23.3 11.8 10.6 10.5 4.9 10.7 
 
Among the politically interested respondents, 78% (17657 out of 22640) were ready to place themselves 
on the scale (in contrast to 64% of the disinterested who have been excluded). Interestingly, the fre-
quency distribution on the total sample deviates considerably from an ideal normal distribution (Table 
2). Given that a 1-10 scale lacks a natural middle position, it is remarkable that the number of respon-
dents chosing five is almost two times higher than those locating themselves on six. In addition, much 
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more respondents select one of the most extreme values (1 or 10) than the more moderate neighboring 
positions (2 or 9).1  
2.4 Ecologism 
The ecological orientation was measured by a summative index (raing from -4 to +4) including the follow-
ing four variables: 
 
1) General care for the environment 
“Now I will briefly describe some people. Using this card, would you please indicate for each description whether 
that person is very much like you, like you, somewhat like you, not like you, or not at all like you? 
‘Looking after the environment is important to this person; to care for nature.’” (a197). 
 
2) Priority of environmental protection (relative to economic growth) 
 “Here are two statements people sometimes make when discussing the environment and economic growth. Which 
of them comes closer to your own point of view? 
‘1 'Protecting environment' 2 'Economy growth and creating jobs?’” (b008). 
 
3) Readyness to sacrifice money for ecological purposes 
“I am going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one, can you tell me whether you strong-
ly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (Read out and code one answer for each): 
‘I would give part of my income if I were certain that the money would be used to prevent environmental pollution.’” 
(b001). 
 
4) Acceptance of higher taxtes for promoting environmental protection 
“I am going to read out some statements about the environment. For each one, can you tell me whether you strong-
ly agree, agree, disagree or strongly disagree? (Read out and code one answer for each): 
‘I would agree to an increase in taxes if the extra money were used to prevent environmental pollution.’” (b002). 
 
As seen in Table 3, the frequency distribution of the summative index is heavily biased toward the posi-
tive side, as the modal values are +2.0 and +2.5 and more than 20% of respondents are in the region +3 
or more, while only 2.6% rank lowest (on values -3 or less).  
 
Table 3: Values of the summative Index of “ecological orientation”. Frequency distribution in the total sample. 
(only politically interested respondents). 
 
 -4.0 -3.5 -3.0 -2.5 -2.0 -1.5 -1.0 -0.5 0 +0.5 +1.0 +1.5 +2.0 +2.5 +3.0 +3.5 +4.0 
N 0 48 286 359 681 421 660 673 1242 1166 1151 858 1550 1769 1299 756 687 
% 0 .4 2.2 2.7 5.0 3.1 4.9 4.9 9.1 8.6 8.4 6.3 11.4 13.0 9.5 5.6 5.0 
 
In addition, a series of other political attitudes have been assessed that have been found to be central 
dimensions of leftist thinking (see for instance (Laver & Budge 1993) 
  
                                            
1
 It is important to note that 670 of the 1543 extreme rightist values originate from Vietnam where almost eighty 
percent of the respondents chose values of 8 ore more. 
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2.5 Classical socialist issues 
1.1 More (vs. less) governmental responsibility for the well-being of society and the individual (+) 
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the 
right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. (Scale 1-10). 
‘The government should take more responsibility to ensure that everyone is provided for vs. People should take 
more responsibility to provide for themselves.’” (e037). 
 
1.2 More (vs. less) government ownership of business (+) 
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale?  
1 means you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement 
on the right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in bet-ween. (Scale 1-10 
‘“Private ownership of business and industry should be increased vs. Government ownership of business and indus-
try should be increased.??’” (e036) 
 
1.3 More (vs.less) income equality (+) 
“Now I'd like you to tell me your views on various issues. How would you place your views on this scale? 1 means 
you agree completely with the statement on the left; 10 means you agree completely with the statement on the 
right; and if your views fall somewhere in between, you can choose any number in between. (Scale 1-10). 
‘Incomes should be made more equal vs. We need larger income differences as incentives for individual effort. ’” 
(e035) 
2.6 Social liberalism issues 
2.1 Justifiability of homosexuality (+) 
“Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in between, using this card.” (Scale 1-10). 
‘Homosexuality.’” (f118) 
 
2.1 Justifiability of abortion (+) 
“Please tell me for each of the following actions whether you think it can always be justified, never be 
justified, or something in between, using this card. (Scale 1-10). 
‘Abortion.’” (f120). 
 
2.7 Issues related to international solidarity 
3.1 Liberal (vs. Restrictive) immigrant policy (+) 
“How about people from other countries coming here to work. Which one of the following do you think the govern-
ment should do? 
‘1 Let anyone come 2 As long as jobs available 3 Strict limits 4 Prohibit people coming. ’” (e143). 
 
3.2 Foreign Aid of own country too low (+) 
“In 2003, this country’s government allocated [a tenth of one percent]* of the national income to foreign aid—that 
is, [$US 38.05]** per person. Do you think this amount is too low, too high, or about right?”  (e129a) 
(This is the sole variable that is not available for the whole sample, as the question has only been asked in OECD 
countries). 
 
3.3 Proudness of own nationality (-) 
“How proud are you to be [e. g. German, French etc.]?  
‘1 Very proud 2 Quite proud 3 Not very proud 4 Not at all proud.’” (g006) 
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3. Empirical Results 
3.1 The level of leftism and ecologism in different countries 
Table 4 informs about the mean values of all used indicators in the different countries. While there are 
high divergences between countries within each region, there are nevertheless some interregional dif-
ferences that need to be commented. 
First of all, the Western European countries stand out as the most leftist group (mean scale value 5.16). 
This leftism seems to be based mainly on liberal attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality, a support 
for diminishing social inequality and a low level of nationalistic proudness.  
 
 
Table 4: Average values of all political attitudes in 27 countries (arithmetic means; only respondents with inter-
est in politics). 
 
 
High 
govern-
mental 
respons. 
(1-10) 
Govern. 
business 
owner-
ship 
(1-10 
More 
income 
equality 
(1-10) 
Justifi-
ability 
of  
Abor-
tion 
(1-10) 
Justifi-
ability 
of ho-
mo-
sexua-
lity 
(1-10) 
Liberal 
immi-
grant 
policy 
(1-4) 
Foreign 
aid too 
low 
Not 
proud of 
country 
(1-4) 
L-R self 
place-
ment 
(1-10) 
Ecolo- 
gical 
orien-
tation 
(-3 - +3) 
N =  
Finland 4.9 4.7 5.9 5.7 6.3 2.6 2.4 1.5 5.6 1.3 368 
Germany 6.4 5.0 6.4 5.2 6.4 2.6 2.3 2.1 4.7 -0.3 949 
Norway 5.9 5.3 6.0 6.9 8.0 2.6 2.4 1.6 5.6 1.6 757 
Spain 6.4 5.4 5.2 5.8 6.7 2.7 2.4 1.6 4.6 0.6 387 
Sweden 4.6 4.8 4.9 7.9 8.6 2.9 2.5 1.5 5.6 1.2 590 
Switzerland 4.7 4.7 7.3 5.6 7.3 2.8 2.5 1.8 5.2 1.4 731 
Canada  5.1 4.3 5.3 4.8 5.9 2.7 2.3 1.2 5.5 1.7 1055 
United States 4.8 3.4 4.8 4.5 4.5 2.5 2.1 1.4 5.8 0.4 744 
Australia 5.1 5.0 5.3 5.9 6.1 2.6 2.4 1.4 5.5 1.1 812 
Bulgaria 6.8 5.8 5.0 5.7 4.1 2.7 -- 1.7 4.7 0.6 410 
Moldova 6.5 5.8 5.1 3.4 2.4 2.7 -- 2.1 6.1 1.1 387 
Poland 6.0 6.5 4.2 3.1 3.2 2.5 -- 1.4 6.0 0.7 401 
Romania 5.7 4.4 5.8 3.7 2.2 2.8 -- 1.7 6.2 0.4 548 
Slovenia 6.3 4.6 6.2 6.4 5.6 2.7 -- 1.5 5.2 1.3 346 
Ukraine 6.9 6.9 4.1 3.9 2.7 2.9 -- 1.9 5.8 0.3 463 
Turkey 6.2 5.9 6.5 2.4 1.8 2.4 -- 1.2 6.0 1.5 490 
Argentina 6.3 6.7 5.6 3.9 6.6 2.7 -- 1.5 5.2 1.2 239 
Brazil 6.6 5.4 5.3 2.7 4.4 2.5 -- 1.8 5.5 1.1 656 
Chile 5.8 6.5 6.3 2.9 5.5 2.6 -- 1.5 5.0 1.4 236 
Mexico 5.6 5.4 4.5 3.4 4.7 2.6 -- 1.2 6.1 1.7 513 
Uruguay 6.1 5.5 5.7 5.0 6.4 3.1 -- 1.3 4.6 0.2 358 
Taiwan 5.8 5.2 3.9 3.7 3.9 2.3 -- 2.2 6.0 1.3 354 
India 6.6 5.6 6.1 3.0 2.9 2.5 -- 1.3 4.3 1.9 719 
Indonesia 5.4 6.1 3.5 1.7 1.5 2.2 -- 1.6 6.9 1.2 695 
Japan 6.8 4.6 4.8 4.6 4.4 2.4 1.9 2.1 5.5 .9 386 
South Korea 7.4 5.4 4.5 3.4 2.7 2.6 -- 1.9 5.8 .5 465 
Vietnam 4.8 5.2 4.7 2.4 1.9 3.3 -- 1.1 9.2 2.1 863 
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On the other hand, the Western-European position toward governmental responsibility, governmental 
business ownership and immigration policy is comparable to the other regions, and – quite astonishingly, 
when the public salience of environmental issues is considered - their ecological orientation is even sig-
nificantly lower (undercut only by post socialist Eastern European countries). 
Unsurprisingly, Eastern Europe stands out by a rather affirmative attitude toward governmental respon-
sibility and governmental business ownership - positions that seem nevertheless compatible with a 
moderately rightist self-placement (5.70) on the LR-scale: a rightism that may stem from more conserva-
tive attitudes toward abortion and homosexuality and rather low values on ecological orientation. In this 
way, they converge with the United States where rightism is associated with very low ecologism and in 
addition with the preference for a rather restricted governmental role.  
Canada and Australia occupy a middle position between Western Europe and the United States: surpass-
ing the latter in ecologism and social liberalism (abortion and homosexuality), and the former in a 
prouder identification with their own nation. 
South American countries converge with Turkey in sanctioning abortion and preferring a rather strong 
governmental role. However, Turkish respondents show much more support for policies aimed at the 
reduction of inequality and at environmental protection. It might be speculated that their high national-
ism (expressed in their proudness of being Turks) may be responsible for their rather rightist ideological 
position. (mean scale value: 6.03). 
Finally, East Asian countries stand out by their most rightist ideological positions (mean scale value 6.69) 
that goes along with a high acceptance of inequality, but nevertheless also with reduced nationalism and 
a high level of ecological orientation. 
 
As a preliminary conclusion, we may summarize that in a macroscopic international perspective, there is 
little evidence that ecologism and leftism are positively associated. While India and the United States 
conform with our major hypotheses by combining a leftist (rightist) standing with a high (low) ecological 
orientation, the same is certainly not true for Germany and Uruguay were leftism goes along with low 
ecologism, and for Turkey, Vietnam, Indonesia and Romania, where the relatively high ecologism is evi-
dently combined with rather rightist positions. As a result, the inter-country correlation between leftism 
and ecologism is not statistically significant (at the 0.05 level). 
 
3.2 “Vertical coupling” between issue positions and left-right ideology in differ-
ent countries 
The factual relevance of the left-right scale can be measured by the degree to which it correlates with 
various attitudes about specific political issues. In settings where a more traditional LR semantics has 
survived, we may find that such correlations are restricted to classical “socialist” issues; in more modern-
ized environments, such covariances may also extend to “postmaterialist” dimensions like feminism, 
pacifism, social liberalism and ecologism. 
 
As a major result, Table 5 shows that there is a rather significant cleavage between Western countries on 
the one hand and all other countries on the other. In Western Europe as well as North America and Aus-
tralia, we find that more affirmative attitudes to all nine leftist issues are associated with lower (more 
leftist) scale self-placements in all nations. The only exception is Sweden where the correlation with “na-
tional proudness” does not reach statistical significance. 
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Table 5: Correlations between self-placement on the left-right scale and various leftist attitudes in 28 countries 
(WVS wave 2007-07; only respondents with medium or high interest in politics). 
 
 Classical Socialism Social Liberalism Internationalism Ecologism  
 
High 
govern-
mental 
respons. 
Govern-
mental  
business 
Owner-
ship 
More 
income 
equality 
Justifia- 
bility of 
abortion 
Justifia- 
bility of 
homo-
sexuality 
Liberal 
immig-
rant 
policy 
Foreign 
aid too 
low 
Not 
proud of 
country 
Ecologi-
cal orien-
tation 
N =  
Finland -.17** -.37** -.36** -.17** -.29** -.12** -.21** -.19** -.25** 378 
Germany -.12** -.19** -.22** -.15** -.22** -.20** -.19** -.21** -.20** 355 
Norway -.25** -.37** -.32** -.10** -.16** -.19** -.28** -.32** -.32** 771 
Spain -.21** -.24** -.20** -.41** -.42** -.25** -.35** -.26** -.38** 323 
Sweden -.51** -.55** -.53** -.10* -.15** -.15** -.24** -.05 -.33** 556 
Switzerland -.31** -.21** -.30** -.20** -.30** -.26** -.23** -.28** -.31** 697 
Canada  -.26** -.15** -.22** -.27** -.28** -.11** -.17** -.11** -.25** 818 
United States -.47** -.21** -.33** -.38** -.42** -.16** -.19** -.33** -.34** 719 
Australia -.38** -.33** -.33** -.24** -.31** -.21** -.19** -.26** -.27** 795 
Bulgaria  -.31** -.28**    -- .11**  353 
Moldova -.22**  -.12**    -- .13*  359 
Poland    -.33** -.28**  -- -.14**  364 
Romania    .14**   --  .10* 422 
Slovenia    -.37** -.26** -.12* --   362 
Ukraine       -- -.24**  334 
Turkey -.14**  -.14** -.18** -.15** -.16** -- -.19**  481 
Argentina -.31** -.26** -.21** -.29** -.25** -.22** --   218 
Brazil -.08**  -.11** -.08*  -.11** -- -.10**  673 
Chile  -.15*  -.16*   --   338 
Mexico -.09**  -.12* -.10*  -.15** --   481 
Uruguay -.16** -.22** -.17** -.15** -.16** -.08 --   345 
Taiwan -.14**  -.14** -.18** -.15** -.16** -- -.19**  481 
India   -.20** .09* .14**  --  -.10* 553 
Indonesia  .12** -.13**    --   556 
Japan -.16**  -.09**  -.22**   -.21**  591 
South Korea -.11*   -.17** -.23**  --  -.12** 463 
Vietnam    -.09** -.14** .09** -- -.22** .09** 1042 
 
By aggregating all samples from Western nations, highest correlations are found with positive attitudes 
toward more govermental responsibility (-.33) and toward increasing social equality (-.32), while lowest 
relationships exist with abortion and immigrant policies (-.18), while all the others (including ecologism 
with .23) are located in-between. 
Several “semiwestern” countries (Turkey, Argentina, Mexico, Uruguay and Taiwan) show analogous 
trends: with the significant exception of ecologism which is evidently not related to the overarching ideo-
logical axis. In addition, Turkey, Brazil and Taiwan deviate in the aspect of governmental business owner-
ship, while in Argentina, Mexico and Uruguay, national proudness shows not the expected negative cor-
relation. 
Outside the core Western nations, only India and South Korea show the expected negative relationships 
between LR-scale values and ecological orientation, while in Romania and Vietnam, an unexpected posi-
tive correlation prevails. 
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By summarizing, it is remarkable that Eastern Europe diverges more from Western countries than Latin 
America or East Asia, as not a single country in this region can be included in the “semi-western” cate-
gory. This is mainly due to the conspicuous absence of relationships with classical socialist issues and 
ecologism as well as with a positive association of leftism and nationalism (in the case of Bulgaria and 
Modlovia) – regularities that not hard to understand in the light of the recent communist past that still 
shapes the political culture within these nations. 
It is characteristic for the Western pattern that associations between leftist issue attitudes and LR-
selfplacements increase considerable with higher formal education. This is seen in Table 6 where sub-
samples of three educational levels are compared according to the total variance of LR-placement ex-
plained by eight (nine) predictors (in linear multivariate regressions). 
 
Table 6: Total variance of LR self-placement explained by eight (nine) political attitudes in 27 countries: according 
to the level of formal education. (WVS wave 2007-07: only respondents with medium or high interest in politics)  
 
 Level of formal education 
 low* medium** high*** 
Finland 18.3 25.2 49.0 
Germany 13.0 18.8 25.7 
Norway 13.1 22.3 43.4 
Spain 29.2 31.5 54.8 
Sweden 21.6 37.6 57.2 
Switzerland 7.6 33.7 35.9 
Canada  8.7 15.6 34.4 
United States 29.2 36.5 56.7 
Australia 12.6 15.2 40.4 
Bulgaria 2.3 18.8 8.8 
Moldova 26.5 5.8 1.4 
Poland 9.1 20.9 2.0. 
Romania 3.5 0.4 4.0 
Slovenia 27.6 2.3 27.5 
Ukraine 1.2 1.7 1.1 
Turkey 2.9 10.8 7.8 
Argentina 6.3 18.9 45.1 
Brazil 1.0 3.6 6.4 
Chile 3.2 3.3 10.6 
Mexico 0.1 1.0 11.8 
Uruguay 7.8 13.2 0.2 
Taiwan 4.2 2.7 1.8 
India 13.5 10.4 7.3 
Indonesia 17.4 10.2 7.9 
Japan 21.9 32.6 14.0 
South Korea 3.8 0.9 8.0 
Vietnam 11.3 4.4 0.6 
 
* only compulsary school ** college or basic or advanced vocational education *** academic education 
 
Especially in the Unted States, Spain and the three Scandinavian countries, extremely high percentages 
of the variance (49% or more) can be explained in the group of highly educated repondents. Outside the 
Western core, only Argentina shows a comparable pattern, while in additional six countries (Bulgaria, 
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Turkey, Brazil, Chile, Mexico and South Korea), at least moderate differences between lowest and high-
est educated subsamples can be observed. 
In all Eastern European countries except Bulgaria and all Asian countries except South Korea, relation-
ships with education are inexistent or even negative. Particularly in Moldavia, India, Indonesia and Japan, 
“Western type” left-right thinking seems to be most frequent within strata with low formal education – 
contradicting blatantly the hypothesis that such thinking is more prominent on elite in nonwestern coun-
tries. 
As to be expected, the correlations between left-right placement and ecologism also increase with 
higher education in all Western countries (Table 7). Again the Unted States (as the “Nader country”) - 
stands out as a nation where the academic elites maintain extremely tight couplings between leftism and 
affirmative stands toward environmental protection. In contrast to Table 6 where several other countries 
follow the Western pattern, only the educational elites of Mexico and Japan seem to have assimilated 
ecologism to their ideological leftism. 
 
Table 7: Correlations beween ecologism and left-right self-placements in 27 countries: according to the level of 
formal education. (WVS wave 2007-07: only respondents with medium or high interest in politics)  
 
 Level of formal education 
 Low
1
 Medium
2
 High
3
 
Finland -.27* -.22** -.39** 
Germany -.12* -.16** -.22** 
Norway -.21** -.28** -.38** 
Spain -.30** -.,35** -.49** 
Sweden   -.45** 
Switzerland  -.31** -.31** 
Canada   -.21** -.28** 
United States  -.32** -.54** 
Australia   -.34** 
Bulgaria    
Moldova    
Poland    
Romania    
Slovenia    
Ukraine    
Turkey    
Argentina    
Brazil    
Chile    
Mexico   -.22** 
Uruguay    
Taiwan    
India    
Indonesia -.31*   
Japan   -.21** 
South Korea    
Vietnam .14**   
 
1
 only compulsary school 
2
 college or basic or advanced vocational education 
3
 academic education 
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By comparing different age cohorts, it can be concluded that no consistent diffusion processes have 
taken place in the last decades. Within the Western hemisphere, only Finland, Norway and Switzerland 
show a rising tendency of leftist ideology in the youngest cohorts. In Eastern European as well as in Asian 
countries, by contrast, we see that Left-Right thinking is most pronounced among the oldest cohorts 
(born 1935 or earlier), while the post war generations have taken more distance from such Western in-
fluences (Table 8). 
 
Table 8: Total variance of LR self-placement explained by eight (nine) political attitudes in 27 countries: according 
to years of birth. (WVS wave 2007-07; only respondents with medium or high interest in politics) 
 
 Birth cohorts 
 -1935 1936-45 1946-55 1956-65 1966-75 1976+ 
Finland 0.1 27.1 30.3 21.8 40.3 48.2 
Germany 35.6 19.6 17.7 18.7 13.8 36.4 
Norway 7.2 24.5 39.8 28.1 29.5 43.0 
Spain 47.5 56.6 8.1 17.5 50.3 37.4 
Sweden 30.4 59.0 46.5 50.2 48.9 52.0 
Switzerland 16.8 27.0 27.8 39.5 29.5 55.5 
Canada  7.1 21.5 26.3 41.0 15.9 3.4 
United States 33.4 23.6 40.9 45.1 47.6 38.3 
Australia 27.8 40.4 25.4 35.9 17.0 26.9 
Bulgaria 53.3 16.0 2.1 40.9 14.2 15.9 
Moldova -- 32.4 28.2 4.9 2.7 8.3 
Poland 52.7 9.2 13.6 3.1 8.9 13.1 
Romania 5.7 1.9 10.4 2.0 0.8 27.5 
Slovenia 53.2 36.8 23.9 10.2 .01 11.5 
Ukraine 86.8 5.9 14.9 10.9 6.1 0.6 
Turkey -- 41.0 5.9 14.7 12.6 0.3 
Argentina -- 18.7 5.4 4.3 10.7 40.6 
Brazil 19.5 12.4 2.1 6.2 14.0 10.4 
Chile -- 49.5 24.8 .01 .02 10.2 
Mexico 45.7 39.2 7.8 3.0 0-0 9.4 
Uruguay 20.1 26.7 6.1 7.2 27.7 20.1 
Taiwan 48.6 2.0 14.6 1.4 3.8 3.1 
India 55.0 15.3 5.6 10.2 4.0 11.5 
Indonesia -- 37.6 4.1 2.4 2.8 7.7 
Japan 44.3 27.6 11.0 4.2 7.8 15.7 
South Korea -- 0.1 21.8 3.6 4.8 25.4 
Vietnam 8.3 1.4 20.9 1.0 3.7 12.1 
 
On the other hand, the results corroborate the hypothesis that the left-right dimension has gained 
weight in Western countries as a result of the rise of postmaterialist “New Social Movements”. In the 
United States, the explained variance rises sharply in the respondents who were youngsters when the 
Berkeley unrests and other protest turmoil occurred –and about “first voters” at the time when the 
ticket Nixon vs. McGovern was at stake (in 1972). 
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Focusing on ecologist attitudes, similar inhomogeneous trends are revealed. While most Western coun-
tries have in common that the oldest (pre war) generation maintains a rather low association between 
leftism and ecologism, two of them (Finland and Germany) show consistently rising tendencies, while in 
all others, curvilinear patterns prevail (Table 9). Disregarding India, there is no hint that any diffusion of 
“leftist ecologism” has recently taken place from Western to Non-western regions. To the contrary, a 
“rightist ecologism” seems to be on the rise in certain countries: especially in Romania where a statisti-
cally significant positive correlation is found among the youngest respondents (born after 1975). 
 
Table 9: Correlations between ecologism and left-right self-placements in 27 countries: according years of birth. 
(WVS wave 2007-07: only respondents with medium or high interest in politics).  
 
 Birth cohorts 
 -1935 1936-45 1946-55 1956-65 1966-75 1976+ 
Finland  -.31* -.33**  -.35** -.39** 
Germany   -.18** -.26** -.32** -.45** 
Norway   -.40** -.25** -.34** -.39** 
Spain  -.52** -.48** -.43** -.45**  
Sweden  -.43** -.30** -.30** -.42** -.37** 
Switzerland -.27** -.28** -.35** -.30** -.28**  
Canada   -.17* -.22** -.40** -.35**  
United States -.22* -.35** -.43** -.37** -.37**  
Australia -.26** -.33** -.15* -.33**  -.34** 
Bulgaria       
Moldova       
Poland       
Romania      .41** 
Slovenia       
Ukraine       
Turkey       
Argentina       
Brazil       
Chile       
Mexico  -.47**     
Uruguay -.41**      
Taiwan  -.33*     
India      -.23** 
Indonesia       
Japan       
South Korea   -.46** -.23*   
Vietnam  .32** .30**    
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3.3 “Horizontal couplings” between ecologism and other leftist issue positions 
In a third step, we want to assess the degree to which ecologism is related to the attitudes of other spe-
cific issues that are conventionally defined in terms of left and right. Again, all Western countries stand 
out as a homogenous group in the sense that in most cases, significant positive correlations can be 
found. In all countries, ecologism shows particularly high associations with the acceptance of homosexu-
ality, the preference for an open, liberal immigration policy and to the judgment that foreign aid to peer 
countries should be increased (Table 10).  
 
Table 10: Correlations between ecological orientation and various political attitudes in 27 countries (WVS wave 
2007-07; only respondent with medium or high interest in politics). 
 
 
High 
govern-
mental 
respons. 
Govern-
mental  
business 
Owner-
ship 
More  
income 
equality 
Justifia- 
bility of 
abortion 
Justifia- 
bility of 
homo-
sexuality 
Liberal 
immigrant 
policy 
Foreign aid 
too low 
Not proud 
of country 
N =  
Finland .17** .16** .12**  .24** .21** .33**  378 
Germany -.14**    .18** .19** .27** .19** 355 
Norway .10** .07* .08*  .13** .22** .32** .19** 771 
Spain .13** .16**  .27** .32** .13* .33**  323 
Sweden .24** .23** .29**  .16** .15** .30**  556 
Switzerland  .10* .14**  .16** .24** .28** .16** 697 
Canada  .13** .09** .12** .11** .21** .14** .28**  818 
United States .24** .10* .16** .17** .23** .17** .30** .15** 719 
Australia .20** .16** .13** .18** .29** .18** .34** .19** 795 
Bulgaria -.25**  -.13*    -- -.14* 353 
Moldova      .15** --  359 
Poland -.15**     .11* --  364 
Romania -.30** -.12* -.27**   .14** --  422 
Slovenia      .24**   362 
Ukraine  -.16**  .13*    -.13* 334 
Turkey       --  481 
Argentina       --  218 
Brazil -.11**   -.10*   -- -.08* 673 
Chile      .18* --  338 
Mexico       --  481 
Uruguay       -- -.15* 345 
Taiwan   -.13*  .21**   -.14** 481 
India .13**     .14**   553 
Indonesia -.17**        556 
Japan      .15** .12*  591 
South Korea .13*    .13** .18**  -.18** 463 
Vietnam    -.08*    -.14** 1042 
 
Similarly strong relationships are found with affirmative views toward extended governmental responsi-
bility and governmental business ownership, where only Switzerland and Germany deviate from the 
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general pattern. Weakest correlations are found with the lack of patriotism and with the abortion issue   
where significant correlations are only found in five (four) countries. 
Looking at the remaining sample of Non-Western nations, only the immigration issue is rather consis-
tently related to ecological orientation (in 8 of 18 cases), while other issues show only sporadic correla-
tions and two of them (governmental responsibility and lack of patriotism) show even (predominantly) a 
negative association. In Eastern Europe as well as in Latin America and East Asia, we evidently find coun-
tries in which care for the environment is part of a positive commitment to the whole nation – not part 
of a global universalism (and an idealistic urge to “save the planet”) as in leftist ideologies in the West.  
 
Table 11: Explaining the ecological orientation by left-right self-placement and eight (nine) attitudes toward po-
litical issues: Multiple linear Regressions: BETA coefficents. (WVS wave 2007-07; only respondent with medium 
or high interest in politics). 
 
 
High 
govern-
mental 
respons. 
Govern-
mental  
business 
ownership 
More 
income 
equa-
lity 
Justifia- 
bility of 
abortion 
Justifia- 
bility of 
homo-
sexuality 
Liberal 
immi-
grant 
policy 
Foreign 
aid too 
low 
Not 
proud 
of 
country 
L-R self 
place-
ment  
% Total 
Variance 
explained  
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.25** 5.9 
Finland .12*    .14* .11* .22**  -- 15.0 
(N =336) .12*    .11* .11* .22**  -.14* 16.8 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.20** 3.9 
Germany -.15**     .12** .21** .08* -- 10.9 
(N =710) -.17*** -- -- -- -- .11*** .20***  -.13** 12.7 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.32** 10.4 
Norway   .09* -.10*  .11** .26**  -- 14.8 
(N = 700)    -.10*  .09** .21**  -.26** 19.7 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.38** 14.4 
Spain  .15**  .10** .20**  .20**  -- 16.2 
(N = 251)     .14**  .17**  -.24** 19.6 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.33** 10.6 
Sweden   .17**    .19**  -- 14.8 
(N = 477)       .18**  -.18** 16.4 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.31** 9.6 
Switzerland   .11**   .17** .19**  -- 12.5 
(N = 544)   .12**   .13** .16**  -.25** 16.8 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.25** 5.9 
Canada  .09** .10**  .16**  .22**  -- 11.0 
(N =670)   .08*  .15**  .21**  -.17** 14.0 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.34** 11.4 
United States .13**   .10*   .23**  -- 14.1 
(N = 676)       .23**  -.23** 17.2 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.27** 7.2 
Australia .10*    .14**  .24** .07* -- 17.8 
(N= 711) .08*    .13**  .24**  -.10* 18.6 
 -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -.23** 5.4 
Total  .05** .06**  .12** .10** .25** -.04**  13.7 
(N = 5083) -.04**    .10** .09** .24** -.06** -.16** 16.0 
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Of course, the correlations reported in Table 10 are not indicating genuine causal relationships, because 
they result from the intercorrelations of the different issues as well as from their common association 
with the overarching left-right scale. 
In order to disaggregate these specific causalities, three linear regressions have been performed for each 
Western country. The first expresses the causal relevance of the left-right scale (without any controls); 
the second informs about the specific contributions of each issue attitude (without controlling LR-
values); and the third articulates the explanation power of issue attitudes and LR-values when all of 
these variables are included in the equation.  
In the case of Finland, for example, we can see that 
- the specific issues explain a much larger share of total variance than the LR self placement, 
- these shares are not much lowered when the LR-variable is controlled; 
-  the LR-dimension nevertheless retains a modest independent explaining power when issue variables 
are included in the equation (Table 11). 
A very similar pattern appears in Australia where explanatory power rises only by 0.8% when the LR di-
mension is added to the list of predictors: in contrast to Norway and Switzerland where the gain sur-
passes 4%.  In all countries, the LR dimension retains part of its independent causal impact when issue 
predictors are controlled, while on the other hand, most issues also remain causally relevant independ-
ent of the ideological LR-scale. 
Among all issue dimensions, the attitude toward foreign aid stands out as the most powerful independ-
ent predictor in all Western countries, while all others don’t reach statistical significance in the majority 
of cases.  
 
Given the rather high convergence of all Western nations, it seems viable to aggregate them to a single 
sample in order to carry out more detailed multivariate analyses concerning divergences between differ-
ent segments of the national populations. 
 
Table 12: Correlations between ecological orientation and various leftist attitudes, according to level of educa-
tion (WVS wave 2007-07; Total Sample of Western countries; only respondent with medium or high interest in 
politics). 
 
Level of 
edu-
cation 
Gender 
High 
govern-
mental 
respons. 
Govern-
mental  
business 
Owner-
ship 
More 
income 
equality 
Justifia- 
bility of 
abortion 
Justifia- 
bility of 
homo-
sexuality 
Liberal 
immi-
grant 
policy 
Foreign 
aid too 
low 
Not 
proud of 
country 
L-R 
 Self-
Place-
ment 
N =   
low 
male -.18**     .16** .17** -.09** -.15** 582 
female -.15**   .13** .13** .16** .16**  -.09* 498 
medium 
male .07*  .09**  .14** .17** .27**  -.17** 1295 
female .07* .08** .09** .12** .19** .13** .29**  -.22** 1261 
high 
male .19** .21** .21** .08** .21** .14** .36** .11** -.36** 1173 
female .16** .13** .16** .08** .20** .23** .32**  -.25** 1030 
 
In a first step, we want to verify whether the positive relationship between educational level and tight-
ness of intercorrelations observed in the case of L-R self placements (see Table 6) also extends to eco-
logical orientation. In fact, Table 12 shows that ecologism is most consistently and strongly associated 
with all issue indicators among respondents with tertiary education. In the subsample with low educa-
tion, correlations remain limited to immigration policy and foreign aid, while classical socialist issues are 
unrelated or even negatively correlated (in the case of governmental responsibility). As a second re-
markable (and unexpected) result, Table 10 suggests that with increasing education, there is a widening 
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gaps between genders: in the sense that males maintain lower interrelationships between ecologism and 
most other aspects of leftism (except immigrant policy and the two “moral” issues: homosexuality and 
abortion). 
By inspecting Table 13, it can be concluded that this gender divergence within highly educated strata is 
mainly caused by younger age cohorts (born after 1965) where the variance of ecologism explained by 
the issue predictors assumes highest values among males, while it drops to lowest levels among female 
respondents. 
 
Table 13: Percentage of total variance of ecological orientation explained by nine political attitudes in Western 
countries: according to level of education, gender and years of birth. (WVS wave 2007-07; total sample of West-
ern countries; only respondents with medium or high interest in politics). 
 
  Birth cohorts 
Level of 
education 
Gender -1935 1936-45 1946-55 1956-65 1966-75 1976- 
Low 
Males 5.0 8.9 22.1 0.1 9.4 (.26.1)* 
Females 2.9 13.4 7.7 24.9 0.2 (1.2)* 
Medium 
Males 9.2 6.4 2.6 12.4 16.5 14.9 
Females 7.2 17.6 17.0 14.5 17.9 8.8 
high 
Males 15.7 14.1 15.0 23.7 26.3 37.9 
Females 7.1 22.7 23.9 23.2 5.1 .05 
  
         * very low number of cases (19/9). 
 
Table 14 provides more specific information about the changes across generations. It is evident that the 
two moral issues (abortion and homosexuality) as well as attitudes toward foreign aid have maintained a 
constant covariance over all age cohorts, while correlations with classical socialist dimensions of leftism 
(related to governmental responsibility, public business ownership and the diminishment of inequality) 
are completely irrelevant in older age group and gain considerable strength in the younger generation 
(born after 1965). The relationships with immigration policy attitudes also gain strength among younger 
respondents. As a consequence, the correlation between ecologism and left-right self placement has also 
risen, as well as the total percentage of explained variance that is minimal on the cohort born before 
1936 and highest in the cohort of 1956-65.  
 
Table 14: Correlations between ecological orientation and nine political attitudes in different age cohorts. (WVS 
wave 2007-07; total Sample of Western countries; only politically interested respondents). 
 
Year of 
birth 
High 
govern-
mental 
respons. 
Govern-
mental  
business 
ownership 
More 
income 
equality 
Justifia- 
bility of 
abortion 
Justifia- 
bility of 
homo-
sexuality 
Liberal 
immi-
grant 
policy 
Foreign 
aid too 
low 
Not 
proud of 
country 
L-R 
self-
place-
ment 
% Total 
variance 
explained 
by all pre-
dictors 
N =   
-1935    .17** .16** .14* .26**   8.4 784 
1936-45    .15** .23** .17** .32**  -.17** 14.9 1046 
1946-55 .06* .15** .08** .15** .26** .18** .31**  -.24** 16.8 1214 
1956-65  .10** .13** .10** .25** .22** .34**  -.27** 20.2 1216 
1966-75 .16** .18** .11** .11** .21** .24** .35**  -.30** 19.5 963 
1976+ .16** .16** .20** .14** .20** .23** .31**  -.28** 17.7 695 
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4. Conclusions 
Unquestionably, environmental protection has become a major dimension of current political ideology 
and political action. As various brands of “Green Parties” in many countries demonstrate, such ecological 
values are often articulated by “leftist” groupings that combine them with classical socialist stances on 
he one hand and other “postmaterialist” issues (like feminism, social liberalism, pacifism, international-
ism) originating in the “New Social Movements” since the late 1960ies. Nevertheless, the association be-
tween leftism and ecologism has remained an open issue: given the diachronic change of leftist ideolo-
gies, the manifold of cultural contexts in which they are embedded, and the divergences between differ-
ent population segments within the respective countries. Based on data stemming from the fifth wave of 
World Values Survey (conducted 2005-2007), such relationships are analyzed comparatively in a sample 
of 27 countries. 
As a first major result, it is found that the Western countries (encompassing Western European, USA, 
Canada and Aiustralia) stand out as a distinct group with a highly homogeneous political culture: homo-
geneous in the sense that in all of them, ecologism shows a tight “vertical coupling” to the general ideo-
logical left-right scale on the one hand and considerable “horizontal couplings” to other leftist issue di-
mensions on the other. In particular, ecologism seems to be part of a wider perspective of transnational 
or (or even global) solidarity that also includes foreign aid and a liberal acceptance of refugees from oth-
er countries. (In fact, ecologist may add to this broad geographical openness a wider outlook in temporal 
terms: e. g. by favoring “sustainable” policy measures in consideration of future human generations). 
India and South Korea are the only nonwestern countries where a similar (however very moderate) cor-
rleation between leftism and ecologism can be found: in contrast to socialism, social liberalism and in-
ternationalism which are vital parts of leftist ideology in several “semi-western” countries (like Argenti-
na, Brazil, Mexico, Uruguay, Turkey and Japan). It is remarkable that no Eastern European country be-
longs to this semi-western category: an indicator that a deeper ideological gap separates Western Eu-
rope from its Eastern neighbors than from any many far more distant countries.  
 
As a second empirical regularity, it is confirmed that at least within Western countries, leftist ideologies 
are most pronounced within highly educated strata of the population. Very few other countries (Slove-
nia, India and Mexico) show a similar pattern: illustrating that there is no world-wide homogeneity on 
the level of academic elites. On the other hand, Western nations differ sharply in the degree to which 
the coupling between leftism and ecologism pervades the less educated strata of population. While this 
penetration is considerable in Span and the three Scandinavian countries, it is completely absent in Aus-
tralia, Canada and the United States.  
Thirdly, a comparative analysis of age cohorts provides very little evidence for major intergenerational 
change: except in the sense that the oldest cohort (born before 1935) seems to be least affected by left-
ist ecologism. In particular, there is no evidence that any interregional or even global diffusion of political 
ideology (e.g. on the basis of modern communication media) has taken (or is currently taking) place that 
would cause more transnational homogeneity (and solidarity) among younger populations.  
 
Finally, a closer look at the Western subsample reveals group-specific differences in the way ecologism is 
embedded in the total web of leftist attitudes. Thus, tighter correlations with classical socialist stances 
and with immigration policy appear in highly educated strata, while the covariances with social liberalism 
and attitudes toward foreign aid are not significantly affected. Similarly, the ecologism of females seems 
less related to classical socialist attitudes – as well as to the overall left-right self placement - than in the 
cases of males.  
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A comparison of age cohorts indicates that within the Western hemisphere, the coupling between eco-
logism and classical socialist stances is on the rise (because highest correlation coefficients are found in 
the respondents born after 1965), while no consistent trends are found with social liberalist or attitudes 
toward foreign aid. 
 
To summarize, we may conclude that “leftist ecologism” is a specific feature of Western countries that 
unites Western Europe with North America and Oceania, but divides them from South America and Asia 
as well as from their neighboring countries to the East: the post-Sowjet nations as well as the middle Eu-
ropean Warsaw Pact countries shaped by Stalinist socialism after World War II.  
This divisive state seems to be highly consolidated and stable, as there are no hints that in Nonwestern 
countries, younger age cohorts or higher educated strata would be more open to Western political ide-
ology than the rest of the population. 
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